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The courts have not wholeheartedly embraced the idea of equality of
the sexes, and therefore do not attack sex discrimination with the same vigor
as they attack racism. Rather, the courts are equivocal about sexual equality
and weigh equality less carefully for sex than for race. Color is thought an
arbitrary distinction; gender, however, is assumed to be something of sub-
stance.
When courts sustain sex discrimination, they generally do not charac-
terize it as such. Rather, differences between the sexes, both real and
imagined, are used to justify the gender distinction.' It is easy to be hypno-
tized by the purported differences between the sexes: to never question how
oppressive sexual stereotypes weave themselves inextricably into the fabric
of our society.
To confront the sexism embedded in our society by the use of such
stereotypes, we must challenge even the most common assumptions and
prevent the perpetuation of false and damaging myths about the differences
between men and women. This is what the courts have failed to do.
One of the most insidious assumptions about differences between the
sexes has to do with the male sex drive. It is presumed to be stronger than
the female sex drive, easily provoked and irresistible. This assumption has
been incorporated into the law in several ways. The idea that women need
protection from that male impulse has been used as a means of upholding
statutes and practices that discriminate against women. This idea can be
* Advocacy Fellow, Center for Applied Legal Studies, Georgetown University Law
Center; B.A., Hollins College, 1977; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1983. This
article began as a student note while the author was a staff member on the New York
University Review of Law & Social Change. The author gratefully acknowledges the assis-
tance of the following people in the preparation of this article: Aaron C. Brown, Sarah E.
Bums, and David A. Koplow.
1. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). This case struck down
regulations requiring that a female member of the uniformed services prove that her spouse
was dependent in order to get increased benefits. Male uniformed servicemen, however,
could claim their wives as dependents without any proof of actual dependency. The court
used a "strict scrutiny" analysis proclaiming sex as a suspect classification. The use of the
analysis in this case has proven to be a fluke since the court has since applied a "middle-tier"
analysis or a rational relationship test when analyzing sex-based classifications.
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found in Supreme Court decisions as well as in lower federal and state court
cases.
2
The failure of the courts to question this myth is a symptom of the
general blindness of the judiciary to the depth of sexual discrimination.
Generally, the courts have not been willing to scrutinize sexual stereotypes
on the basis of the inequality and damage which these stereotypes create.
The courts only seem willing to challenge stereotypes after they have become
outdated The failure to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment has eliminated
the possibility of a speedy legislative solution to the intransigence of the
courts .4
The courts fail to address the fact that the burden of sex discrimination
always falls on women. Any real differences are equal differences: women
are as different from men as men are from women. Yet in the legal system,
when the court notes "real" differences between the sexes as a reason for
discrimination, women consistently lose.
This phenomenon reveals how the law assumes a male point of view.
Male behavior is assumed to define the norm. Therefore, any departure
from that norm is treated as a "defect." Women are expected to bear the
burden of that "defect" and behave in such a way as to fit within the male
norm. Surely if the law saw the world through women's eyes, the burdens
derived from the differences between the sexes would be distributed equally.
Equal protection analysis rests upon the legal principle that people
"similarly situated" must be treated similarly by the law.- The Court has
found that all races are similarly situated 6 and thus has invoked "strict
scrutiny" when the law creates racial classifications. 7 However the Court
has been unwilling to find that the sexes are completely "similarly situ-
ated. ' 8 In some cases, the Court found that the difference between the sexes
justifies the sex-based classifications.9 Therefore, the Court developed a
lower standard of review for classifications based on sex-as opposed to
race-discrimination.
2. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065
(1969).
3. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which struck down an Idaho statute that
preferred males to females as estate administrators. The Court refused to find that general-
izations about women's business experience vis-b-vis men's warranted such a preference.
4. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692. The concurrence refuses to apply a strict scrutiny
standard, noting that the issue is before the legislature, and stating that the Court should
await a legislative decision.
5. See, e.g., Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
6. See Karst, Foreward: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv.
L. Rev. 1 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). This is but one example. Other
specific instances of the Court finding the sexes not similarly situated are discussed infra.
9. Id.
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The courts persistently find the sexes not similarly situated when sex
becomes sex-when men and women mingle, when sex means more than
mere gender. 10 The courts have assumed that men's sexual urges are greater
than those of women." Therefore, the law has incorporated this "physical"
difference12 with two results: women are protected from these urges, and
men are excused from their "animal nature.' '1 3 The judicial solution to the
difference between sex and sex has been the doctrine that, until proven
otherwise, separate will be presumed to be equal in the context of sex.' 4
"Separate but equal" was rejected in the area of race because the
Supreme Court found that this rationale perpetuated the racial distinctions
on which it was based and resulted in a society which was separate but
unequal.' 5 In so holding, the Court was not hindered by the idea that blacks
needed protection from whites.
In contrast, the Court has not considered whether women's inferior
status is perpetuated as a result of courts excusing behavior by men under
the rubric of men's "uncontrollable urges" and courts proclaiming that
women need protection from men.'0 This article discusses the courts' articu-
10. This issue arises when men and women must deal with each other, often under close
and unstructured conditions, in the workplace, in the home, and in public places. See Parts II
& III infra.
11. Such an intuitive knowledge of men's greater sexual appetite is most clearly revealed
and discussed in Dothard. Popular descriptions of the supposed distinctions are more
normative than descriptive. This is shown by the myth-exploding effect of recent pioneering
studies of human sexual functioning. See A. Kinsey, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male
(1948); A. Kinsey, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (1953); W. Masters & V. Johnson,
Human Sexual Response (1966). The lack of a clear ground for these distinctions in biologi-
cal science may explain why the notion of the male irresistible impulse has been the subject of
judicial notice and not evidentiary proof.
12. See, e.g. Annot., Constitutionality of Rape Laws Limited to Protection of Females
Only, 99 A.L.R. 3d 129 (1980). This concept is further examined in the text accompanying
notes 127-75 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 127-75 infra.
14. Although not called separate but equal, the result is just that. See, e.g., Vorch-
heimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). But see Newberg v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ.,
No. 5822 (1st Dist. Pa. Ct. Common Pleas Aug. 30, 1983) (invalidating sex segregation in
schools on federal and state grounds; the court criticizes Vorchheirner).
15. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In the area of sex, however, the
Court's position has been ambivalent. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982) ("Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classifica-
tion is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory
objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.") However, in Hogan, the Supreme
Court condoned discrimination when used to assist "the sex that is disproportionately
burdened." Id. at 728. While this language permits affirmative action where appropriate, it
also would permit a court to perpetuate unequal treatment where unproven assumptions
about sexual differences and roles are used to justify a finding of disproportionate burdens.
16. See, e.g., Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
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lation of the assumed hazards of integrating the sexes and analyzes the
severe obstacles such reasoning imposes on the struggle for women's rights.
The judiciary avoids squarely addressing sexuality issues. Instead, it
alludes darkly to an inherent problem in mixing the sexes.' 7 Phrases such as
"moral and social problems," 8 "risks,"' 19 and "womanhood, ' 20 are in-
tended to evoke a sense of recognition in the reader that needs no more
explication.
Consistently, courts have held that the threat of arousing deep urges in
men justifies the finding that men and women are not similarly situated. 2'
Once this threat is introduced, women lose: they lose jobs,2 2 they lose
educational opportunity,2 3 they lose credibility as complainants in rape
cases,2 4 they lose the ability to take sexual initiative,25 and they lose liberty
through incarceration. 216 Men have corresponding gains from these assump-
tions. Men gain the jobs women lose,27 men gain seniority in the work
environment,28 men are granted excuses for their crime.29 Generally men
have access to the world without fear.
This article is divided into two parts. It will first examine the judicial
history of the assumption of the male irresistible impulse and then focus on
its present application in employment, education, and criminal areas.30
17. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68, 76-78 (1981).
18. Goesart, 335 U.S. at 466.
19. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335.
20. Id. at 335-36. Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeny, 422 U.S. 256 (1979).
21. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Long v. Cal. State Personnel
Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974).
22. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But see Bundy v.
Jackson, 19 F.E.P. Cas. 828 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
23. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale
L.J. 1365 (1972).
25. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
26. See, e.g., State v. DevaIl, 302 So.2d 909 (La. 1974).
27. When women are totally precluded from jobs as in Dothard, that increases the
number of jobs for men.
28. See C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 40 (1979). MacKinnon
discusses the fundamental impact of sexual harrassment on women in the workplace. Charac-
terized by some as petty flirtation, such treatment hinders women's ability to function and
progress in work hierarchy.
29. See text accompanying notes 146-75 infra.
30. See text accompanying notes 31-51 infra for the judicial history and text accompa-
nying notes 52-182 infra for current court decisions.
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II
HISTORY
The idea of protecting women from men can be found in the Supreme
Court's first decisions on the rights of women. Over a century ago, in
Bradwell v. Illinois,31' Justice Bradley noted:
[T]he Civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of men and
women. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life .... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to
fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the
law of the Creator.32
In Bradwell, the Court justified upholding laws that prohibited women
from practicing as attorneys, through a narrow reading of the "privileges
and immunities" clause of the Constitution.3 3 The assumption in Justice
Bradley's concurrence was not based on any physiological data, but merely
on the prevailing religious and social stereotype of women's roles. The
determination that women were inherently delicate, combined with the cor-
responding determination of a need to protect women from men who may
take advantage of women's delicate nature, made a decision adverse to
women inevitable.
In 1908 the Supreme Court, in Muller v. Oregon,34 upheld an Oregon
protective labor law that prohibited women from being employed in any
"mechanical establishment, factory, or laundry" more than ten hours a
day. 35 An employer's violation of that lav resulted in a misdemeanor con-
viction and a ten to twenty-five dollar fine.36 The defendant invoked Loch-
ner v. New York,37 the well known substantive due process case that prohib-
ited protective labor laws for bakers. The Court acknowledged that Lochner
was relevant but found that the difference between the sexes justified a
different rule.38 The Court took judicial notice of the innate nature of
women, 39 and speculated:
31. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
32. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring, joined by Swayne, J. & Field, J.).
33. Id. at 139.
34. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
35. Id. at 416.
36. Id. at 417.
37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner had struck down a law prohibit-
ing bakers from working more than ten hours a day or sixty hours a week. The Court found
that such a law was an unconstitutional hindrance on the right to contract and an invalid
exercise of the state's police powers.
38. 208 U.S. at 412, 423.
39. Id. at 421.
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Even though all restrictions on political, personal, and contractual
rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes are
concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him, it would still
be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to
him for protection; that her physical structure and proper dis-
charge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her
own health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to
protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. 40
Thus the Court assumed that, due to the nature of a woman's body and her
social function, women must be protected from men. This protection took
the form of restrictive labor laws for women. Upholding labor laws that
protected only women may have relieved women of the burden those hours
imposed. But such action also made women less marketable in the work
force since employers had to make special provisions and shifts for them. 4'
Goesart v. Cleary42 cemented the notion that men have impulses which
women are physically and morally unable to reject. 43 Goesart denied an
equal protection challenge to a Michigan law prohibiting women from being
bartenders unless they were the wives or daughters of the bar owners. 44 The
Court noted that Michigan could prohibit all women from working as
bartenders, 45 but questioned whether Michigan could make a distinction
between wives and daughters and all other women. 40 It upheld the distinc-
tion and, consequently, the prohibition because of the "moral and social
problems" inherent in the mixing of the sexes. 47
[SIince bartending by women may... give rise to moral and social
problems against which [the legislature] may devise preventive mea-
sures, the legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition if
it believes that as to a defined group of females other factors are
operating which either eliminate or reduce the moral and social
problems otherwise calling for prohibition. 48
Despite the Court's recognition that this prohibition may have been a ruse
for maintaining the male monopoly in bartending, it accepted the preven-
40. Id. at 422.
41. See Ross, Sex Discrimination and "Protective" Labor Legislation, supplemental
material in Hearings on H.J. Resolution 35,208 and Related Bills Before Subcomm. No. 4 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1971) and in Hearings on §
805 of H.R. 16,098 Before Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. 592 (1970).
42. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
43. Id. at 466.
44. Id. at 465.
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tion of "moral and social problems" as a reasonable ground for a legislative
distinction. 49 The Court did not define these problems, nor was it clear
whether the bar owner was to protect the women from the men, or the men
from the women. The Court did conclude, however, that it was acceptable
to exclude women from employment because of these problems.-" This
paradox emerges again in the recent cases. 51
These older cases reveal the blatant stereotypes that were used to keep
women from competing with men as attorneys, as bartenders and in the
workplace generally. The recent cases rely on the same notion that women
need protection from the passions of men. Now the idea is carefully phrased
and more subtly refined, yet its impact on the struggle for women's rights is




Women have been denied employment to "protect them" from men.32
When faced with problems involving the mixing of sexes in the workplace,
courts are quick to find that excluding women will solve the problem. For
example, in some circumstances, being male is considered by the courts a
"bona fide occupational qualification" under Title VII53 because women's
nature creates temptation that is best avoided by hiring only men.51
For example, in 1974, Louise Long, a Methodist minister, applied for a
position as chaplain at a juvenile detention center for males (the average age
was 192). 55 Her application was rejected due to a "male-only" certification
49. Id. at 467.
50. Id. Goesart probably would not be good law today. See Sail'er Inn Inc. v. Kirby, 5
Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). This case found a law, similar to the one in
Goesart, unconstitutional under the California constitution. In a footnote the court noted
that "no judge today would justify classification based on sex by resort to such openly biased
and wholly chauvinistic statements. .. " 5 Cal. 3d at 17, 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at
339. The California constitution, however, includes an equal rights amendment which re-
quires the courts to apply strict scrutiny when dealing with sex-based classifications. The
United States Supreme Court has not gone so far as to require strict scrutiny, and Goesart
has yet to be overruled with "mid-level scrutiny."
51. See notes 66-78 infra and accompanying text (e.g., Dothard).
52. See text accompanying notes 55-82 infra.
53. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334.
54. Id. at 335.
55. Long v. California State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562
(1974).
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given that position by the California State Personnel Board.50 After Long
brought a suit against the Personnel Board, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's finding that a sex-based classification was warranted by the fact
that the juvenile detention center housed 400 males, some of whom had
been convicted of sex offenses.5 7
The court assumed that a woman is only safe from men if under the
protection of men.58 The court noted that there were female employees but
that they "all work in locations where male staff members [can] see them at
all times and [are] readily available for immediate assistance in case of
emergency." 59 The court reasoned that since a female chaplain would be
alone with 400 young male offenders, sexual attack was "not only a possi-
bility but a probability." 60 The male impulse was assumed to be so strong
that it would necessarily emerge in this setting.
That difference between men and women, unproven by any evidence,
allowed the court to approve of discrimination in hiring. The court did not
require evidence of the inevitability of sexual attack, nor did it consider the
possibility of additional security in the facility. This would have placed the
burden on the employer, rather than on the woman.
The court admitted that whether or not a female chaplain chooses to
encounter such danger must be left to the applicant seeking the specific
employment. 6' The court made clear that it did not reach its decision solely
on the basis of protection of women. The court's holding was based primar-
ily on the need to protect the male wards from the "temptation" of women.
From the point of view of the ward, the court found a compelling state
interest in a male-only classification.6 2 The court concluded:
At best it is foolish to put temptation of this sort in the path of such
wards when it can reasonably be avoided. And the effect upon the
ward who succumbs to temptations and commits the sexual offense
is disastrous. He has committed a separate crime for which he can
and probably will be independently punished. He has interrupted
his course of rehabilitation, and very possibly rehabilitation in his
case has been utterly thwarted with a result that a youthful of-
56. Id. at 1002, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 563. The "male-only" certification was obtained only
after Long's application for the position, so the court also considered the due process issue olr
whether Long was entitled to notice and participation in the hearing on certification. Id. at
1005-06, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67.
57. Id. at 1011, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
58. Id., 116 Cal. Rptr. at 570. The Court assumes that a facility which houses malejuvenile delinquents poses problems for all women but not for any men, even those who are
small or weak.
59. Id. at 1004, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
60. Id. at 1011, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
61. Id. at 1013, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
62. Id., 116 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
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fender who might have returned to society as a law-abiding, pro-
ductive citizen does precisely the opposite and becomes a perennial
outlaw. 63
Thus women become a "temptation" that can easily be avoided-
simply deny them employment.6 4 The males, by contrast, were excused from
their anticipated bad behavior (sexual assault) because it was viewed as a
"probable" reaction to temptation. 65 The court saw male sexual impulses as
uncontrollable. The court did not consider that such acts are illegal and not
condoned. Women were required to bear the responsibility of preventing
such illegal acts by giving up job opportunities. Therefore, due to male
(mis)behavior, women are denied jobs. Such a paradox of law is the result
of viewing the world from a male point of view.
The Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning three years later in
Dothard v. Rawlinson.66 Diane Rawlinson, an applicant for a position as a
prison guard in an Alabama men's prison, successfully challenged the
height/weight requirements as a violation of Title VII. 67 While the suit was
pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections passed Administrative Regula-
tion 204 which established a gender criterion for assigning prison guards to
maximum security institutions for positions requiring continuous close
physical proximity to inmates.68 The state defended the rule under the bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception to Title VII.69 The Court
upheld the BFOQ determination of the district court.70
The reasons for sustaining Administrative Regulation 204 were based
on the notion of "protection." The Court mingled the ideas that women
should be protected from men, and that men should be protected from
temptation. The Court noted that because the prison housed violent men
and in particular because twenty percent of its population were sex offend-
ers7 1 it was an unsafe place for women as guards. 72 Furthermore, the mere
fact of a guard's "womanhood" would create problems for the prison.73
The Court wrote:
A woman's relative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-
security, unclassified penitentiary of the type Alabama now runs
63. Id., 116 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
64. Id., 116 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
65. Id., 116 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
66. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
67. Id. at 331.
68. Id. at 324-25.
69. For a full discussion of the bona fide occupational qualification exception to Title
VII, see Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (1971).
70. 433 U.S. at 334.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 335-36.
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could be directly reduced by her womanhood. There is a basis in
fact for expecting that sex offenders who have criminally assaulted
women in the past would be moved to do so again if access to
women were established within the prison. There would also be a
real risk that other inmates, deprived of normal heterosexual envi-
ronment, would assault women guards because they were
women....
The likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she
was a woman would pose a real threat not only to the victim of the
assault but also to the basic control of the penitentiary and protec-
tion of its inmates and other security personnel. The employee's
very womanhood would thus directly undermine her capacity to
provide the security that is the essence of a correctional counselor's
responsibility.7 4
Here the Court assumed that the biological fact of being a woman
made it impossible to perform the duties of a correctional officer, since that
biological fact would necessarily create violent reactions in men and under-
mine their self-control.
In addition to its own speculation about the nature of the male sex
drive, the dissent points out that the Court considered the testimony of the
State Commissioner of Corrections who analyzed the difference between the
effectiveness of men and women as prison guards on the basis of:
the innate intention between male and female. The physical capa-
bilities, the emotions that go into the psychic make-up of a female
vs. the psychic make-up of a male. The attitude of the rural type
inmate we have vs. that of a woman. The superior feeling a man
has, historically, over that of a female.7 5
In considering the testimony, the dissent charges that the Court drew on
another sex-based reason for prohibiting women from employment as
guards: since the men in the area considered themselves superior to women,
they were likely to respond violently to a woman in a position of power over
them.76 Because of the difference in social status of men and women, the
Court was willing to condone the men's potential violent acts and exclude
women from employment.
The Court would not treat similarly a parallel situation involving race.
For example, even though some of the inmates in an Alabama prison were
convicted of Ku Klux Klan-type crimes and were actively involved in "white
74. Id.
75. Id. at 344 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 345.
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gangs,"177 there were no administrative regulations preventing blacks from
being correction officers. Using the Dothard logic, such regulations could be
supported because both the immutable biological fact of race and these rural
whites' sense of white superiority might lead to violence. Despite such
reasoning, in a race case, such an administrative ruling would not withstand
judicial scrutiny.
The clear message of the majority opinion in Dothard was that women
prison guards' mere presence would provoke both sexual and superiority
feelings in male inmates. The inmates could not be blamed or held account-
able for these impulses. These impulses would be uncontrollable and thus
threaten prison security. In his dissent, Marshall criticized this assumption:
In short, the fundamental justification for the decision is that
women as guards will generate sexual assaults.With all respect, this
rationale regrettably perpetuates one of the most insidious of the
old myths about women-that women, wittingly or not, are seduc-
tive sexual objects. The effect of the decision, made I am sure with
the best of intentions, is to punish women because their very pres-
ence might provoke sexual assaults .78
The Dothard opinion incorporates a companion myth about men. Men
are helpless actors who cannot control their libidinous impulses. To be safe,
women can only stay out of men's way-anything else risks rape.
This myth shows that rejecting the role of sexual object is only half the
battle of combatting sex discrimination. The complementary depiction of
males as a source of danger to women, and not responsible for their acts,
instills fear in women and thereby restricts mobility. It provides an indepen-
dent rationale for discrimination against women in employment. The
Court's failure to challenge this assumption, even in dissent, perpetuates the
fear created by this myth, as well as the discrimination the myth provokes.
In Warshafsky v. The Journal Company,79 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin denied an equal protection challenge to a parens patriaeo law
prohibiting minor females from working as paper route carriers. The Wis-
consin court's reasoning shows an acceptance of the idea that women must
be protected, even if this protection excludes women from jobs. It noted
that minor male paper carriers had been physically attacked and robbed, but
77. See J. Fox, Organizational and Racial Conflict in Maximum Security Prisons
(1982).
78. 433 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. 63 Wis. 2d 130, 216 N.W. 2d 197 (1974).
80. Parens patriae is the legal fiction that the state functions as the "father" of all
children and consequently safeguards their interests; see Websters' Third Int'l Dictionary,
1641 (P. Gove, ed. 1968).
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that no male paper carrier had ever reported sexual molestation.," The court
reasoned: "If, however, minor girls were permitted to be employed as paper
carriers, the results would undoubtedly not be so fortunate."' 8 2 Thus, the
court denied an employment opportunity to the minor female, because the
court assumed the inevitability of sexual assault.
In their treatment of sexual harassment cases, courts have frequently
confronted the mixing of the sexes in the employment area. Catherine
MacKinnon has documented the impact of sexual harassment on women's
employment mobility. 83 She suggests in her book, Sexual Harassment of
Working Women, that sexual harassment is one of the major reasons
women leave jobs and lose the seniority needed to advance. "' Yet, until the
late 1970's, the courts refused to redress this victimization. The courts
preferred to characterize such claims as over-reactions to normal male
attention occurring when the sexes mingle.8 5
The sexual harassment cases highlight the distinction courts make be-
tween sex and sex. Torn by whether the term "sex" in Title VII covered the
mixing of sexes, the courts ultimately restricted the term to mean gender
rather than the interaction of the sexes.86
With one or two recent exceptions, the courts have also narrowed the
issue by limiting the kinds of claims which will be recognized as sexual
harassment to the "exaction of a condition [upon employment opportuni-
ties] which but for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced." '8 7 By
reducing the claims to those incidences of sexual harassment that are clearly
conditions upon employment, the courts avoid the larger part of the prob-
lem of sexual harassment. 8  Even though it appears that there is a broad
standard for challenging sexually harassing conditions, the cases demon-
strate that, for most judges, the boundaries are restricted. 9
81. 63 Wis. 2d at 141, 216 N.W. 2d at 202. The Court's view that minor males were not
at risk should be seen in light of recent mass murders of young males in Atlanta and Los
Angeles; see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1982, at A14, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 27, 1981, at
A14, col. 1.
82. 63 Wis. 2d at 141, 216 N.W.2d at 202.
83. C. MacKinnon, supra note 28.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Vermeulen, Employer Liability Under
Title VII for Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Employees, 10 Cap. U.L. Rev. 499, 517-18(1981); Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment under Title VII (unpub-
lished manuscript to appear in 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change).
86. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
87. Id. at 990 n.5.
88. See Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII,
supra note 85. Courts will sometimes accept that sexual harassment is a condition of
employment, see Bundy v. Jackson, 19 F.E.P. Cas. 828 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 641 F.2d 934(D.C. Cir. 1981). But courts often require that such harassment be "pervasive"; thus the
question is transformed into a burdensome element of proof which can discourage litigation.
89. See text accompanying notes 90-104 infra. The language of these decisions indicates
the judiciary's high tolerance for "sexual misbehavior" in the workplace.
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In 1975, a plaintiff charged sex discrimination for sexual harassment
under Title VII in Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.90 The plaintiff alleged that
her supervisor, Mr. Price, subjected her to verbal and physical sexual ad-
vances. The issue before the court was whether the plaintiff stated a claim
for relief under Title VII. 9' The district court found that the behavior did
not represent a company policy: "Mr. Price's conduct appears to be nothing
more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism. By his alleged
sexual advances, Mr. Price was satisfying a personal urge. "9 2 The claim, the
court found, was therefore not actionable under Title VII. The Court
explained: "[a]n outgrowth of holding such an activity to be actionable
under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee
made amorous or sexually-oriented advances toward another. The only sure
way an employer could avoid such charges would be to have employees who
were asexual. ' 93
In Miller v. Bank ofAmerica9 4 the Northern District Court of Califor-
nia reaffirmed the Come court's interpretation of Title VII.95 A female
employee of Bank of America, whose performance had been rated superior
and who had been given a salary raise, claimed sexual harassment under
Title VII. 6 She alleged that she had been fired shortly after her promotion
because she had refused her supervisor's demands for sexual favors from
her.9 7 The district court refused to find a cause of action under Title VII,
stating:
It is conceivable under plaintiff's theory, that flirtations of the
smallest order would give rise to liability. The attraction of males
to females and females to males is a natural sex phenomenon and it
is probable that this attraction plays at least a subtle part in most
personnel decisions. Such being the case, it would seem wise for the
courts to refrain from delving into these matters short of specific
factual allegations describing an employer policy which in its appli-
cation imposes or permits a consistent, as distinguished from iso-
lated, sex-based discrimination on a definable employee group.99
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court in 1979, after other circuits
had supported claims under Title VII for sexual harassment. 9
90. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.
1977).
91. Id. at 162.
92. Id. at 163.
93. Id.
94. 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
95. 418 F. Supp. at 235-36.
96. Id. at 234.
97. 600 F.2d at 211.
98. 418 F. Supp. at 236.
99. 600 F.2d 211.
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A cause of action for sexual harassment was finally found under Title
VII in Barnes v. Costle.100 It is disturbing, however, that the D.C. Circuit
interpreted the issue as gender discrimination, and thus failed to address the
implied assumptions about sexual interaction. 10 It was this same court that
held that a "discriminatory environment" of sexual harassment may give
rise to a Title VII violation. 02 Nevertheless, the tone of the former cases
indicates that courts will tolerate a considerable amount of "personal
urges ' 10 3 resulting in "mere [sic] amorous or sexually-oriented advances"104
before finding a sexually harassing environment.
Cases such as Barnes distinguish sexual harassment from such discrimi-
natory treatment as requirements that women flirt with customers or look
provocative as receptionists, to the passing over of women for promotion-
or even firing them-because they become less valuable as a decoration as
they get older. None of these fundamental problems are considered sexual
harassment, perhaps because they have more of a connection with sexual
behavior.105 When sex discrimination has an element of sexual behavior,
and is more than mere gender, it becomes unactionable. 00
The employment cases reveal the "heads I win, tails you lose" nature
of the application of the assumption of a male irresistible impulse. Women
are denied jobs to protect them from sexual assault in Dothard. Women are
denied jobs in Long so that young boys can be protected from the tempta-
tion of women. The common thread which emerges is that women are
denied employment.
In sexual harassment cases, the balance between the need to protect
women from men and the need to protect men from women determines
whether the claim is actionable. The courts act suspiciously toward claims of
sexual harassment. The thinly veiled but unarticulated burden of proof falls
on the woman to show that she did not provoke the behavior or that she is
not maliciously prosecuting a defenseless male for "petty flirtation." In
either case, the woman is seen as somehow causing the behavior in men.
100. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
101. Id. at 990.
102. Bundy v. Jackson, 19 F.E.P. Cas. 828 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
103. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
104. Id.
105. In Barnes, the court makes clear that the action is a form of gender discrimination,
and that the case might be different if the sexual harassment had not been an extraordinary
burden placed on women. 561 F.2d at 990. This suggests that sexual harassment or discrimi-
nation is acceptable if not based on gender, but on sexuality.
106. But see Carroll v. Talman Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032-38 (7th
Cir. 1979) (bank requirement that female tellers, but not male tellers, wear uniforms held
discriminatory condition of employment).
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B. Education
Prohibiting women's access to education has been a significant element
in discrimination against women.10 7 Today, most of these restrictions, but
not all, have been lifted and women have the recognized right to equal
opportunity for a full education. 08 Nevertheless, occasionally a sex-based
classification is brought before the courts.'0 9 The rationale for upholding
sex-based discrimination in the face of a challenge is often the presumption
of the male irresistible impulse.
Sexual tension that results from the mingling of the sexes was relied
upon by the Third Circuit in Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadel-
phia" to sustain single-sex public high schools. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found an inherent educational value in sex
segregation."' However, the District Court still enjoined the segregation
stating that there was no "fair and substantial" justification for the discrim-
inatory treatment." 2
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed this decision,
noting that "there are differences between the sexes which may, in limited
circumstances, justify disparity in law. '" 3 The sex-based classification in
this case was not based on gender-specialized educational opportunity,1
4
but rather on the "adolescent energies" '15 that hinder learning when the
sexes are mixed. The court presumed that these energies, or urges, are
uncontrollable and therefore that sex-segregation is a legitimate educational
remedy for curbing the impulses. The result was that Ms. Vorchheimer was
prohibited from attending the school of her choice.
107. See generally E. Flexner, A Century of Struggle (rev. ed. 1975).
108. But see Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S.
951 (1971). In this case, the male plaintiffs sought admission to Winthrop College, a South
Carolina state school for women. This district court upheld the college's single sex status
because it was "a school for young ladies, which, though offering a liberal arts program,
gave special attention to many courses thought to be specifically helpful to female students."
Id. at 136. In a footnote, the court detailed such course offerings: stenography, typewriting,
telegraphy, bookkeeping, drawing, designing, engraving, sewing, dress-making, millinery,
art, needlework, cooking, housekeeping, and "such other industrial arts as may be suitable
to their sex and conducive to their support and usefulness." Id. at 136 n.3.
109. See, e.g., Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 136.
110. 400 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir.1976), aff'd per
curiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
111. 400 F. Supp. at 335. ("This Court would probably have felt compelled to validate
the sex-segregated school on the basis of Dr. Jones' hypothesis concerning the competition
for adolescent energies in a coed school and its detrimental effect on student learning and
achievement.")
112. Id. at 343.
113. 532 F.2d at 888.
114. Id. at 882. The court states, "The academic facilities are comparable, with the
exception of those in the scientific field, where [the male school's]... are superior." But see
Newberg v. Bd. of Public Educ., No. 5822 (Ist Dist. Pa. Ct. Common Pleas, Aug. 30, 1983).
In Newberg, the court reviewed the same schools and found significant differences.
115. 532 F.2d at 882.
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Such an outcome is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's attitude
toward racial segregation on the basis of "separate but equal" treatment.
After having permitted such segregation for more than half a century," 0 the
courts finally recognized that that doctrine had been used to perpetuate race
discrimination. Apparently the analysis of race discrimination that the
Court used in Brown v. Board of Education'1 7 is not transferable to the sex
discrimination arena.
In August of 1983, the sex segregation in Philadelphia schools was
invalidated by the state court in Newberg v. Philadelphia Board of Public
Education."" This class action suit involved the same school as the Vorch-
heimer case. Unlike the Vorchheimer court, the court in Newberg examined
the relative quality of the male high school and the female high school, and
found the male institution to be superior.11 9 In its analysis, the state court
applied the Pennsylvania state constitution's equal rights amendment and
concluded: "the separate-but-equal concept under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (as applied in Vorchheimer, supra)
does not have currency." 1 20 Nevertheless, as a matter of federal law, the
separate but equal rationale still is the dominant federal rule.
C. Rape
The court's treatment of "sexual urge" is most fully revealed in the
common and statutory law on rape. The probability of sexual assault is used
to justify denying women access to employment.' 2' The presence of natural
sexual feelings leads the courts to be suspicious of claims of sexual harass-
ment. 2 2 Sex segregation in education cases is sometimes justified by the
belief that it is impossible to control sexual energies.123 In the area of rape,
differential treatment is based on all of these grounds: assumptions about
male sexual urges, the probability of sexual assault, and the presence of
natural sexual feelings.
The law distinguishes three kinds of rape, and in each women suffer
from the application of the grounds described above. First, in statutory rape
cases the underage female's consent is not recognized as valid under the
116. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
117. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
118. No. 5822 (Ist Dist. Pa. Ct. Common Pleas, Aug. 30, 1983).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 49. However, the United States Supreme Court, in Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), noted that Hogan did not address the issue of
"separate but equal" allowing the doctrine to stand as approved in Vorchheimer. Id. at 720
n. 1.
121. See, e.g., Long v. California State Personnel Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 562 (1974). See text accompanying notes 52-82 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 83-106 supra.
123. See text accompanying notes 107-120 supra.
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law. 2 4 Second, in forcible rape cases, a bevy of procedural requirements
protect the accused from being prosecuted.' Third, in cases of forcible
intercourse within marriage, this act is not considered a crime in most states,
but rather an enforcement of "a wifely duty."'' 6
1. Statutory Rape
Thirty-seven states have gender neutral statutory rape laws which im-
pose sanctions on persons who engage in sexual intercourse with male or
female children below a certain age. 12 7 Many of these statutes require a
significant age-differential between the partners. 12 Although these statutes
are gender neutral in language, they are not always applied to the sexes
equally. 12 9
Facially discriminatory statutes still exist in many states, and in Michael
M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court,130 the Supreme Court upheld a
California statute which penalized only the male. In Michael M. the age
difference between the parties was small: the boy was 17 and the girl was
16 years of age.' 3 1 The statute in question defined statutory rape as "an
act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the
perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years."' 32
The Supreme Court validated the statute's gender-based distinction
upon a rationale developed by the California Supreme Court: the need to
124. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); see
also Edison, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 757 (1980).
125. See, e.g., Robin, Forcible Rape: Institutional Sexism in the Criminal Justice
System, in The Criminal Justice System and Women 241 (B. Price & N. Sokoloff eds. 1982)
[hereinafter Forcible Rape].
126. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (Essex County Ct.
1977).
127. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. See, e.g., Weiner, Shifting the Communications Burden: A Meaningful Consent
Standard in Rape, 6 Harv. Women's L.J. 143 (1983). There is probably some age at which
boys and girls are incapable of giving consent to sexual intercourse. This is particularly true
when one partner is significantly older than the other partner. However, such laws should be
carefully drawn so that they are not sex-specific nor do they penalize genuinely consenting
parties who are close in age.
129. See generally Chesney-Lind, Guilty by Reason of Sex: Young Women and the
Criminal Justice System, in The Criminal Justice System and Women 77 (B. Price & N.
Sokoloff eds. 1982).
130. 450 U.S. at 466.
131. Id. at 406. The facts revealed that Michael M. and two friends approached Sharon
and her sister at a bus stop around midnight. After some talk, Sharon and Michael walked
off together to kiss. When Sharon refused Michael's request that she remove her pants,
Michael struck her. Presumably this did not rise to the level of forcible rape. It appears that
somewhat later Sharon agreed to have intercourse with him. Michael M. was convicted of
statutory rape. These facts are particularly compelling for a conviction in Michael M.
Nevertheless, under the California statute had Sharon been older than Michael or had she
approached Michael, Michael would still be culpable for the crime of statutory rape.
132. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981).
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prevent teenage pregnancies. 33 Neither court, however, made an indepen-
dent inquiry into the legislative intent. Instead both accepted without inves-
tigation the prosecutor's uncontested assertion that the purpose was to
protect young women from risks of pregnancy. 134
Despite the requirement that the government show a substantial rela-
tionship between a gender-specific statute and the legislative goal,135 the
Court failed to address the relationship between the statute and the ostensi-
ble legislative goal. The pregnancy deterrence rationale ignores the fact that
a gender-neutral statute would achieve the same goal,1 36 and that, if prevent-
ing pregnancy were the statute's only rationale, the statute could only apply
to prepubescent girls through juridicial extension. 137
Clearly, the Court in Michael M. inferred the pregnancy deterrence
rationale to uphold the statute; in doing so, the Court reinforced discrimina-
tory stereotypes. The Court punishes men for engaging in sexual activity to
which both parties consent. 38 This legislative scheme characterizes females
as victims of sexual activity and views males always as "aggressors." Males
are seen as the initiators who need criminal sanctions to deter them.
Rather than focus on a deterrence rationale, the Court's inquiry should
have been whether the ostensible victim had the capacity to give meaningful
consent.1 39 Surely, both men and women of a given age have the same ability
to give meaningful consent to sexual intercourse. And, such an inquiry
could have considered the age difference between the parties in order to
protect the young, whether male or female, from abuse from older persons.
In theory, the Court's refusal to consider the ability of young women to
consent to sexual activity harms men and not women. In the context of all
statutes governing juvenile sexual activity, however, the inability of the law
to admit that girls are capable of consenting to sexual activity harms girls.
Girls are far more likely to face legal sanctions and longer confinements for
engaging in sexual intercourse than are boys.1 40 The juvenile courts have
broad discretionary powers giving them jurisdiction over a wide variety of
juvenile activity.' 4' More than fifty percent of the girls who are sent to
133. 450 U.S. at 470.
134. Id. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. This is the burden established by the Supreme Court for gender based classifica-
tions. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
136. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 493 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Furthermore, under the pregnancy deterrence rationale, a girl/woman who uses
birth control has little disincentive to have sex. Nevertheless, the state will still have the
opportunity to prosecute the male. This logic is inconsistent with the legislative intent behind
the other rape statutes discussed infra.
138. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. See Casenote, MichaelM. v. Sonoma County, 25 How. L.J. 341, 365 (1982).
140. See, e.g., Armstrong, Females Under the Law: "Protected" but Unequal, in The
Criminal Justice System and Women (B. Price & N. Sokoloff eds. 1982).
141. Id. at 68.
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institutions by juvenile courts are sent for noncriminal offenses. In contrast,
only twenty percent of the boys sent to institutions are sent for noncriminal
offenses.142 Most of these status offenses are for non-prostitutional sexual
activity of the female. 43 Institutionalization is imposed for punishment and
as a protective safeguard. 44 Furthermore, despite the higher incidence of
noncriminal offenses, female delinquents receive longer sentences than their
male counterparts. 45
Thus, the "protection" offered by statutory rape and other laws actu-
ally may harm a young woman's freedom to act. In this area, as well as
other areas discussed in this article, the assumption that women need protec-
tion from men is used to limit and control women's activities.
2. Forcible Rape
The courts perpetuate sex discrimination by justifying rape with the
assumption that the mixing of the sexes inherently causes strong and some-
times uncontrollable impulses in men. Consistent with this assumption are
the views that unscrupulous and non-virtuous women can take advantage of
these impulses and that men are "victims" of their own urges. Therefore the
courts have imposed a host of procedural rules and evidentiary requirements
that give alleged rapists more legal protection than other accused felons. 40
Consent is one defense to rape. Consequently, in some states the prose-
cution must show some corroborating evidence of the rape and evidence of
resistance.1 47 This requirement strongly discourages prosecution of rapists,
and is only justified by a popular conception that false accusations of rape
are common, a misconception which has not been supported by any hard
facts.148
Although the law does not recognize precipitation or provocation as a
defense to a charge of rape, jurors do consider this "defense." Studies of
rape have included the category of "victim-precipitated rape."' 49 Mena-
chem Amir conducted such a study in the Philadelphia Police Department
from 1958-1960.1 -5 Amir defined victim-precipitated rape as
(a) situations where the woman actually or apparently agreed to
intercourse "but retracted before the actual act or did not react
142. Id. at 69.
143. Id. at 68.
144. See To Be A Minor and Female, Ms. Mag. Aug. 1972, at 70, 74.
145. Armstrong, supra note 140, at 69.
146. See generally Beinen, Rape I1, 6 Women's Rights L. Rep. 3, 187 (1980); Forcible
Rape, supra note 125.
147. Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L.J.
1365 (1972).
148. Id. at 1368.
149. Forcible Rape, supra note 125, at 255.
150. Id. (citing M. Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape 155 (1971)).
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strongly enough when the suggestion was first made by the of-
fender" and (b) risky or vulnerable situations "marred with sexual-
ity"-e.g. the woman uses indecent language and makes gestures
that can be interpreted by the man as an invitation to sexual
relations. Thus, where the woman aroused the defendant without
intention of intercourse, agreed to have a drink or go for a ride
with a stranger, or didn't resist her assailant's sexual advances
strongly enough, victim precipitation was considered present. 151
Courts have found an implied consent from evidence of what the victim
was wearing and what she was doing. Courts apply the rationale that a
virtuous woman does not get into situations that open her to sexual assault.
In 1977, a California Court of Appeals judge commented that a woman who
hitchhikes asks to be raped.1 52 He asserted that by entering a stranger's car a
woman "advertises that she has less concern for the consequences than the
average female.' ' .3
A similar comment resulted in the successful recall election of a judge
in Madison, Wisconsin.' 4 The judge found a fifteen-year-old defendant
guilty of rape but rejected the prosecutor's suggestion that the defendant be
placed in a residential school or group home. Rather, he sentenced the boy
to a year at home under court supervision.5 5 The judge justified such a
lenient sentence, saying that Madison's sexually permissive climate and the
provocative clothing worn by modern women made rape a normal reaction
for young men. 56
As one commentator put it:
These attitudes often encouraged a stance of easy tolerance toward
rapists, resting on beliefs that rape was only a mildly aberrational
form of normal male behavior, that most women wanted to be
raped; that a rape accusation was commonly the product of a
woman's over-active fantasy life or a distorted expression of shame
about her voluntary sexual activity; or that rape was the more or
less ineluctable consequence of a woman's communication of her
sexual desires, subtly or otherwise, to a hapless male. 57
One judge recently asserted in southwestern Wisconsin that even chil-
dren can take sexual advantage of the "hapless male." The case involved a
151. Id.
152. Time Mag., Sept. 12, 1977, at 41. The defendant's conviction for rape was re-
versed, although on different grounds. See People v. Hunt, 72 Cal. App. 3d 190, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 675 (1977).
153. Time Mag., Sept. 12, 1977, at 41.
154. Washington Post, Sept. 8, 1977, at All, col. 4.
155. Washington Post, Aug. 26, 1977, at A7, col. 1.
156. Id.
157. Letwin, Unchaste Character, Ideology and the California Rape Evidence Laws, 54
S. Cal. L. Rev. 35, at 35-36 (1980).
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five-year-old girl who was sexually assaulted by her mother's boyfriend.' s
Allegedly, the child jumped on the man while he was sleeping in the nude.
She was later found to have been sexually assaulted.,' 9 The judge sentenced
the girl's assailant to ninety days on a work release program and three years
probation. During sentencing, the judge noted that he was giving the of-
fender a light sentence because he found the five-year-old victim to be "an
unusually sexually promiscuous young lady."160 He stated that he did not
exactly blame the child, because "she is only five years old," but, he added,
"I do believe that she was the aggressor. I have no concern that he is a threat
to other children in the community."' 6' The outrageousness of the judge's
remarks caused a great deal of anger in the Wisconsin community.16 2
Equally disturbing is the judge's assumption that if the girl aroused the
defendant, he was unable to control himself.
The assumption that a male has sexual needs that are greater or more
easily aroused than a female's was challenged by Margaret Mead in Sex and
Temperament.16 3 Mead described the Arapesh society in which the crime of
rape is unknown:
The Arapesh do not have any conception of the male nature that
might make rape understandable to them. Our interpretation of
rape is a product of our conception of the nature of male sexuality.
A common retort to the question, why don't women rape men, is
the myth that men have greater sexual needs, that their sexuality is
more urgent than women's. 164
Despite such anthropological observations, that "myth" is seldom
challenged in American society. Men are judged by a lenient standard while
rape victims are harshly scrutinized. Perhaps the courts will not go so far as
to openly admire the male primitive instinct, but the courts seem to accept as
a mitigating factor the assumption that men must fight off their dominant
sexual impulses in order to obey the law.18 5
3. Marital Rape
As of 1983, at least thirty states did not allow a wife living with her
husband to charge him with the crime of rape."' These rules are either
158. Mitchard, Judge Says Girl, 5, Invited Sex Assault, Capital Times, Jan. 8, 1982.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Allegretti, Wisconsin Judge's Rape Ruling Angers Residents, Washington Post,
Jan. 21, 1982.
162. Id.
163. M. Mead, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935).
164. Id.
165. Letwin, supra note 157.
166. Note, Abolishing the Marital Exemption for Rape: A Statutory Proposal, U. Il1. L.
Rev. 201 (1983); see also Freeman, "But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Who[m] Can You
Rape?": The Marital Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 Farn. L. Q. 1 (1981).
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codified in statutes or presumed under common law. 6 7 The marital rape
exception has been expanded in ten states to apply to unmarried cohabi-
tants. 68 Three states have created a "voluntary social companion" exemp-
tion which prohibits a charge of first degree rape if the victim was a
voluntary social companion of the accused rapist at the time of the rape and
had allowed the defendant sexual contact within a fixed period of time prior
to the alleged rape 6 9 or, in some states, at any time prior to the alleged
rape.170 By accompanying a man on a date and/or voluntarily engaging in
sexual contact, a woman is presumed to have consented to any further
contact, and is barred from charging first degree rape.
The marital rape exemption reinforces the stereotype that a woman's
proper role is to provide sex for men.' 7' Sex is considered a way to calm the
male's impulses; the wife's obligation is to always be available to provide
the outlet for her husband's sexual impulses. As John Hailer, Jr. and Robin
Hailer noted in their study of Victorian America:
in marrying, [women] have simply captured a wild animal and
staked their chances for future happiness on the capacity to tame
him.... The duty imposed upon her by high heaven, to reduce all
the grand, untamed life forces to order... to make them subservi-
ent to the behests of her nature, and to those vast, undying interests
which to these two and to their posterity, center in the home.1 2
The stereotype outlived Victorian society, as George Gilder's recent
book Sexual Suicide reveals. 73 Gilder's image of the ideal society is one in
which women serve men's physical needs and bear children.17 4 "Women
domesticate and civilize male nature. They can destroy civilized male iden-
tity merely by giving up that role. 1 75
Rape laws reflect the idea of a male irresistible impulse by incorporat-
ing the implicit notion that a woman should be on notice. The statutory rape
sanctions are to "protect" young women who are unprepared to deal with
167. Note, supra note 166, at 203 (list of 34 states with statutory provisions for a marital
rape exemption); Gonning, Spousal Rape Exemption, 65 Marq. L. Rev. 120, 133-35 (1981);
see also State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (Essex County Ct. 1977).
168. Morris, Marital Rape Exemption, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 597, 608 (1977).
169. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 707-730(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1980). See also Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 252(3) (West Supp. 1980).
170. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 764 (1978).
171. See Smith, 148 N.J. Super. at 227-28, 372 A.2d at 390.
172. J. Hailer & R. Hailer, The Physician and Sexuality in Victorian America 90 (1974).
173. G. Gilder, Sexual Suicide (1973).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 25.
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sexuality. But the law's protection changes when the woman is an adult. A
mature woman is considered to be on notice about male sexuality and
should conform her behavior to it. If she marries or even dates the man, she
may have no remedy should he rape her. If she does charge him with rape,
her actions are suspect-did she assume the risk since she exposed herself to
a wild animal?
The underlying assumption in the criminal justice system is that some-
how women are responsible for rape. That assumption is veiled in the rape
setting. In the arena of prostitution, it is baldly asserted.
D. Prostitution
The concept of the uncontrollable male sexual impulse, which is used to
reduce a man's culpability for rape, is also used to justify disparate prosecu-
tion of customer and prostitute, and of male and female prostitutes. It is
often observed that the demand for prostitutes creates the supply. 70 Men
create the demand; yet women are the parties who are consistently prose-
cuted. 177
Among the many policies cited to justify criminal sanctions against
prostitution is the need to protect the customer. In 1915, a New York court
in People v. Draper78 referred to legislative intent in enacting the prostitu-
tion statute:
It must be entirely obvious that the purpose of the Legislature was
not to place in the hands of two or more prostitutes, voluntarily
accompanying one or more men upon a night's debauch, the power
to blackmail these erring brothers, under the threat of a term in
State prison, but rather to reach and punish those conscienceless
vampires who make merchandise of the passions of men.1
Such legislative attitudes explain the continued selective enforcement of
prostitution laws by city police departments. Prostitutes are consistently
arrested, while their male "johns" are released. Some prostitution statutes
do not cover the customer, others make frequenting a prostitute a lesser
charge. This "selective enforcement" has not been held unconstitutional:
upholding this selective enforcement supports the idea that protection of
customers continues to be the underlying intent for prostitution laws.60
176. See, e.g., S. DeBeauvoir, The Second Sex (1949).
177. See People v. Superior Court (Hartway), 19 Cal. 3d 338, 138 Cal. Rptr. 66, 562
P.2d 1315 (1977).
178. 169 A.D. 479, 154 N.Y.S. 1034 (3d Dept. 1915).
179. 169 A.D. at 484, 154 N.Y R at ne2
180. See, e.g., Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind. 471, 306 N.E.2d 95, appeal dismissed, 419
U.S. 811 (1974), appeal after remand, 340 N.E.2d 764, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1975).
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The "differences between the sexes" was used to justify a gender
specific statute in a 1974 equal protection challenge to a Louisiana statute
that defined prostitution as a "practice by a female of indiscriminate sexual
intercourse with males for compensation."""' The defendant challenged the
statute as violative of equal protection because it punished female but not
male prostitutes. The court found: "[w]hen an activity by women may, in
the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems
against which it should devise deterrents, the legislature may enact laws to
accomplish such a purpose.' 1 82 After finding the female-specific statute
constitutional, the Louisiana court noted: "Differences between the sexes
does [sic] bear a rational relationship to the prohibition of prostitution by
females."1 83
The court assumed that the logic behind the argument supporting the
sex-based distinction was self-evident. It argued that there was no need to
explain the "differences between the sexes"; rather the court assumed that
everyone knew what they were. The court saw prostitution by women as a
greater moral and social problem than male prostitution. Men's passions
can be excited and used against women; yet women's use of power creates a
moral problem that justifies legislative action.
IV
DISCUSSION
The willingness of courts to perpetuate the notion of the male uncon-
trollable urge through the guise of protectionism obfuscates the real sexism
involved. The decisions discussed in this article merely serve to maintain
male power. They expect women to operate around men in a limited role
and within the male-defined system. The notion of an uncontrollable urge,
which is provoked by women, excuses men for their behavior and reinforces
the social and political tendency to blame the victim. 184 It perpetuates the
idea that men's violence against women is inevitable and thereby plays upon
women's fear for their own physical safety. 185 The perceived threat of rape,
181. State v. Devall, 302 So. 2d 909, 910 (La. 1974).
182. Id. at 911.
183. Id. at 913.
184. The uncontrollable male urge reveals itself elsewhere in the criminal justice arena.
Formerly such an urge could be the basis of a defense in Texas for a husband who kills when
he sees his wife in bed with another. The correlative defense for the wife was unavailable.
Prior to 1973, Texas Penal Code provided: "Homicide is justifiable when committed by the
husband upon one taken in the act of adultery with the wife, provided the killing takes place
before the parties to the act have separated." See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1220 (1973); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 1220 (1961).
185. For a good discussion of women as victims see Klein, Violence Against Women:
Some Considerations Regarding Its Causes and Elimination, in The Criminal Justice System
and Women 203 (B. Price & N. Sokoloff eds. 1982).
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and of invoking the male urge, functions much like a protection racket in
which men protect their women from the abuse of other men. 80 Mae West
once said, "Every man I meet wants to protect me. Can't figure out what
from."187
Courts continue to differentiate sex from sex, treating this distinction
as a genuine difference between the sexes. George Gilder notes such a
response:
Perhaps the most quixotic of all female demands is that men at
work treat women first as 'human beings'. Male psychology is in
large part a reaction formation, shaped in relation to women. As
women invade further realms conventionally regarded as mascu-
line-and as modern technology transforms other male roles-men
will increasingly define themselves as not women. Their response
will be increasingly sexual.' 88
Differences between the sexes are just that-a man is as different from
a woman as a woman is from a man. Therefore, logically, there should be
no disproportionate impact on a woman because she is "different." The
social phenomenon of gender hierarchy defines the standard of normalcy as
the male standard. The superior position of men in our current society
infects the definition of these differences and expands their effects.
The law must begin to address the inherent sexism in the relationship
between the sexes. Men are not "wild animals" and women are not their
"tamers." The concept of the uncontrollable impulse is no reason to excuse
a man from an abuse of male power. This does not suggest a neo-Victorian
prudery. Catherine MacKinnon put it well:
[W]e are not attempting to be objective about it, we're attempting
to represent the point of view of women. It has been the point of
view of men up to this time that has distinguished so sharply
between rape on the one hand, intercourse on the other; sexual
harrassment on the one hand, normal, ordinary sexual initiation on
the other; pornography or obscenity on the one hand and eroticism
on the other. The male point of view defines them by distinction.
What women experience does not so clearly distinguish the normal
everyday things from which those abuses have been defined, by
distinction.18 9
186. Despite the outrage that some of the recent rape opinions have provoked, such
decisions continue to be made. The courts implicitly decide what is appropriate female
behavior. These decisions have more than an immediate effect on the case at hand-they
restrict women as a class.
187. Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, in The Criminal Justice System and
Women 224 (B. Price & N. Sokoloff eds. 1982).
188. G. Gilder, supra note 173, at 108.
189. MacKinnon, Violence Against Women-A Perspective, Aegis 51, 52 (1982).
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Gender domination pervades the entirety of women's existence. In
order to understand sexism fully, women must recognize sexual intimida-
tion. Such intimidation forces women to accept a male defined world and to
function within those male definitions.
Sex-neutral, objective formulations avoid asking whose expression,
from whose point of view? Whose law and whose order? ...
[W]hat we do see, what we are allowed to experience, even in our
own suffering, even in what we are allowed to complain about, is
overwhelmingly constructed from the male point of view .... I
think that when we fail to assert that we are fighting for the
affirmative definition and control of our own sexuality, as women,
and that these experiences violate that, we have already been
bought.9 0
Legal analysis should challenge the male dominated perspectives on
legal reasoning. Too often sexist reasoning masquerades as sex-neutral for-
mulations. The law is incorporating assumptions about male impulses that
affect women's employment, credibility, and criminality. This suggests an
inevitability of women's inferior protected status.
If mixing the sexes is blindly assumed to be dangerous to women, the
goal of equality of the sexes can be no more than the goal of separate but
equal. But women want more than their place in the established order.
Challenging the assumption about male urges and female provocation
makes that clear. Women are seeking fundamental change in the relation-
ship between the sexes.
V
CONCLUSION
This article traced a specific and narrow assumption, namely that there
is a 'male irresistable impulse' which can be used as the basis for discrimina-
tion between the sexes, through a wide variety of situations and cases. On
one hand it may appear that the assumption is too rare and trivial to merit
serious consideration. On the other hand, it may seem that the scope of its
application makes it too vague to be an instrument of meaningful legal
change. What is a simple integral idea from a woman's experience is frag-
mented and disguised by traditional male legal assumptions and reasoning.
If law is to be a tool in the struggle for women's freedom, however, women
must be free to define their oppression as they see it.
For once the English language has become an ally of feminism: sex
cannot be differentiated from sex. The attempt to differentiate only serves
to obscure the clear line between freedom, right and women's dignity, and
190. Id. at 57.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XII:357
THE MALE IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE
the continuation of the long history of oppression and degradation. Al-
though the cases cited are only examples, and by no means the worst, of
legal discrimination against women, they have been selected here to high-
light the assumptions and logic. The job is less to overturn these specific
decisions than to make female experience intelligible within the framework
of legal reasoning. Until this happens, courts will continue to deliver unjust
results and many women will find legal decisions alien and unrelated to their
experience.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1983-1984]
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
